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Consumers React to Biotech Food Information 
Biotech food labeling has become a contentious issue in the United States and between
the United States and some of its trading partners. The Economic Research Service has
released a technical bulletin, The Effects of Information on Consumer Demand for
Biotech Foods: Evidence from Experimental Auctions, that provides new evidence on the
power of science-based information to affect consumer response to agricultural biotech-
nology. Agricultural biotechnology is a collection of scientific techniques, including con-
ventional hybridization that are used to modify or improve plants, animals, and microor-
ganisms. Recently, the term “biotechnology” has been used to refer more specifically to
products that have been genetically engineered (biochemical manipulation of genes or
DNA). This is the meaning of the terms “biotech” and “genetically engineered” used in
this report.
What Is the Issue? Proponents of mandatory biotech-food labeling argue that consumers
have a right to know whether their food has been produced using genetic engineering. A
number of countries, including Australia, China, Japan, and the members of the European
Union have adopted mandatory biotech-food labeling provisions.
Opponents of mandatory labeling argue that such labeling will confuse, and in many
cases, unnecessarily alarm consumers. In the United States, only biotech foods that dif-
fer substantially from their conventional counterparts require special labeling (FDA,
2001). Thus far, no biotech foods on the market have required labeling. Numerous pro-
ducers in the United States are voluntarily producing and marketing non-biotech foods.
In January 2001, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration issued voluntary guidelines for
non-biotech labeling (FDA, 2001). 
How Was the Study Conducted? Market data – data on price and quantities actually pur-
chased – would provide the best indication of consumer attitudes towards labeled biotech
foods. Unfortunately, such data do not exist because, to our knowledge, no biotech labeled
foods are currently marketed in the United States. In the absence of market data, analysts
must rely on other sources of information to gauge consumer preferences, such as surveys
of consumer attitudes or experimental market studies. 
Experimental economics can generate consistent high quality data for testing hypotheses
when other options for data collection are unavailable. Although a relatively young field,
experimental economics helps us to understand consumer choices by allowing econo-
mists to test alternative hypotheses in a systematic manner. In the experiment reported
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here, real consumers facing real choices create data on economic choices and incentives. As in
other fields, experimental economics has limitations in its assumptions and hypotheses. A key
challenge is designing an experimental environment where the researcher can be certain that
the results mean what they think they mean.
In 2001, an experimental auction was conducted to elicit consumers’ willingness to pay for
food items with and without biotech labels. A total of 172 consumers participated in 12 sepa-
rate auctions conducted in two Midwestern U.S. cities. Participants were given the opportunity
to bid for and purchase three different food products—a 5-pound bag of potatoes, a 32-ounce
bottle of vegetable oil, and a 1-pound bag of corn tortilla chips—with and without biotech
labels. None of the food products had biotech-enhanced consumer attributes (such as better
taste or nutrition) or biotech traits that could be detected without sophisticated testing tech-
nologies, if at all. 
Prior to the bidding, each participant received one of six information packets containing state-
ments about biotechnology gathered from a variety of sources. Pro-biotech statements were pro-
vided by a group of leading biotech companies. Greenpeace provided anti-biotech statements.
Science-based verifiable statements were provided by a group of individuals knowledgeable
about biotechnology, including scientists, professionals, religious leaders, and academics, none
of whom had a financial stake in agricultural biotechnology. The six information packets varied
by the type of statements they contained. One packet contained only pro-biotech statements; one
contained only anti-biotech statements; one contained pro- and anti-biotech statements; one con-
tained pro-biotech and scientific statements; one contained anti-biotech and scientific statements;
and one contained scientific and pro- and anti-biotech statements. The source of each statement
was identified. 
What Did the Study Find? Participants’ bids, or the amount they were willing to pay, for
biotech-labeled and plain-labeled foods were affected by the information packets they
received. Participants who received only pro-biotech information bid slightly more on the
biotech-labeled food for two of the three products. Participants who received only anti-biotech
information bid less for the biotech-labeled foods by an average of 35 percent. Those who
received both pro- and anti-biotech information bid less for the biotech-labeled foods by an
average of 16, 24 and 29 percent, depending on the food product. These results are consistent
with other studies that show individuals place a greater weight on negative information than
on positive information. 
Interestingly, scientific information had a greater affect on consumers’ behavior than pro-
biotech provided by leading biotech companies. Participants who received information packets
including anti-biotech from Greenpeace and pro-biotech from biotech companies discounted
the biotech-labeled foods on average between 16 to 29 percent, depending on the food prod-
uct. When participants received science-based information, in addition to both pro- and anti-
biotech  information, the average price discount dropped to between 0 and 11 percent.
Science-based pro-biotech information strongly offset anti-biotech information.
This study provides new evidence on the powerful role of information in shaping consumer
response to agricultural biotechnology—and reveals that consumers react not just to the con-
tent of information, but also to the source. Scientific, verifiable information had a larger mod-
erating effect on consumers’ reaction to anti-biotech statements than pro-biotech statements
from biotech companies. The results also highlight the erratic effect of biotech labeling in the
absence of unbiased scientific information. Without scientific information, the bid-price for
biotech-labeled foods varied from slightly above that of plain labeled foods to 35 percent
below. With scientific information and pro- and anti-biotech information, the price consumers
bid for biotech-labeled foods was only slightly below that for plain-labeled foods. 
Abstract
Consumers’ willingness to pay for food products decreases when the food label indicates
that a food product is produced with the aid of modern biotechnology. This bulletin pres-
ents empirical evidence on consumers’ willingness to pay for biotech foods based on the
presence or absence of labels advising that the food was prepared with the aid of biotech-
nology. The authors designed and conducted an experimental auction to elicit consumers’
willingness to pay for “genetically modified” (GM)-labeled and standard-labeled foods
under different information regimes. The evidence gathered for vegetable oil, tortilla
chips, and potatoes shows that labels matter. In particular, under all information treat-
ments, consumers discounted food items labeled “GM” by an average of 14 percent.
While gender, income, and other demographic characteristics appeared to have only a
slight impact on consumers’ willingness to pay for biotech foods, information from inter-
ested parties and third-party (independent) sources was found to have a strong impact. 
Keywords: Biotech, bioengineering, biotechnology, food labels, auctions, experimental
economics, random nth price, willingness to pay.
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Summary
This bulletin presents empirical evidence on consumers’ willingness to pay for
foods with and without biotech labels. The findings were derived from laboratory
auction experiments for three food items: vegetable oil, tortilla chips, and pota-
toes, about which consumers were given pro-biotechnology, anti-biotechnology,
and independent, third-party information. The results indicated that consumers’
willingness to pay for food products decreases when the food label indicates that a
food product is produced with the aid of modern biotechnology (biotech foods).
(According to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and U.S. Department of
Agriculture (USDA), “bioengineered” or “biotech” are preferable terms to
describe foods produced with the aid of modern biotechnology. However, “geneti-
cally modified (GM)” and “genetically engineered” are also commonly used to
describe biotech foods in academic publications. Since we used the terms GM and
“non-GM” in our experimental auctions, we continue to use these terms in this
bulletin whenever we refer to the labels in the experimental auctions.) Under all
information treatments, consumers discounted food items labeled “GM” by an
average of 14 percent. In addition, gender, income, and other demographic charac-
teristics appear to have only a slight impact on consumers’ willingness to pay for
biotech foods. However, information from interested parties and third-party infor-
mation do influence consumers’ willingness to pay for biotech and (perceived)
non-biotech foods. It was found that consumers who received only negative infor-
mation about agricultural biotechnology paid 35-38 percent less for food products
labeled “GM,” depending on the product. When the negative information was
coupled with independent, third-party information, consumers were willing to pay
17-22 percent less for “GM”-labeled food. Likewise, when given only positive
information about agricultural biotechnology, consumers bid higher for “GM” than
for plain-labeled food in two of the three food items. However, when they are
provided with both positive information about biotechnology and the independent,
third-party information, consumers bid higher for plain-labeled food in all three
cases. An independent, third-party source that provides verifiable information on
biotechnology has a significant impact on consumers’ demand for biotech foods.
Third-party information had its greatest impact on consumers who received nega-
tive information, prompting them to view biotech foods more favorably. Also, the
use of the term “GM” (rather than biotech or bioengineered) might have influ-
enced the results.
Consumers’ desires to make informed decisions about their food purchases have
made the biotech food labeling issue an important public policy debate. The debate
revolves around the benefits and risks of agricultural biotechnology. Agribusiness
companies like Monsanto support agricultural biotechnology and say that biotech
foods will help protect the environment, increase nutrition, and end world hunger.
Environmental groups like Greenpeace oppose agricultural biotechnology and say
that biotech foods cause allergic reaction, hurt the environment, and increase the
power of multinational companies. The average consumer (and farmer) may rely
on the information from these interested parties to make their decisions on biotech
products. Currently the United States does not have a mandatory labeling policy
for biotech foods, but several other countries do. Implementing a mandatory
labeling policy in the United States might have benefits, but also involves costs,
both variable and fixed. Moreover, further analysis of the data collected for this
study shows that the current U.S. voluntary labeling policy is more efficient than
mandatory labeling policy (Huffman et al., 2002). 
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The bulletin examines several issues. First, do biotech food labels have any signifi-
cant effect on consumers’ willingness to pay for biotech and non-biotech foods?
Second, is consumers’ willingness to pay for biotech foods affected when they
receive information from interested parties? Third, would an independent, third-
party group providing information (e.g., verifiable information) about biotech-
nology change consumers’ purchasing behavior? Finally, do socioeconomic factors
(e.g., gender, income, education) affect consumers’ willingness to pay for biotech
food items? 
The bulletin combines tools of survey design, statistical experimental design, and
the laboratory experimental auction mechanism to answer these questions. The
experiments used a randomly selected sample of 172 consumers from two
Midwestern cities: Des Moines, IA, and St. Paul, MN. The 172 auction partici-
pants were assigned to 1 of 12 experimental units, each consisting of 13-16 partici-
pants. Six information packets: (1) pro-biotechnology; (2) anti-biotechnology; (3)
both pro- and anti-biotechnology; (4) pro-biotechnology and third-party, verifiable
information; (5) anti-biotechnology and third-party, verifiable information; and (6)
pro-biotechnology, anti-biotechnology, and third-party, verifiable information were
randomized among all 12 experimental units, with each information packet going
to two experimental units. When a participant received both pro-biotechnology and
anti-biotechnology information, the order was randomized, so that some partici-
pants received the pro-biotechnology information first, and others received the
anti-biotechnology information first. Participants then bid (sealed) on the three
products separately, each product with and without a “GM” label.
Much future research on this topic remains. The food products in these auctions,
although bioengineered, were deemed substantially equivalent to the conventional
commodity. In some biotech foods, however, biotechnology may be used to
enhance the quality (e.g., protein, fat, sugar content, shelf life) of the product,
although not all of these products are in the market. Future research could examine
how consumers react to biotech foods that have specific benefits. Future research
could also examine if the language on the labels (e.g., “GM,” biotech, bioengi-
neered, genetically engineered, etc.) would have significant impact on consumers’
willingness to pay for biotech foods. 
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Introduction
Consumers’ desires to make informed decisions about
their food purchases have made the biotech food labeling
issue an important public policy debate. The debate
revolves around the benefits and risks of agricultural
biotechnology. Agribusiness companies like Monsanto
support agricultural biotechnology and say that biotech
foods will help protect the environment, increase nutri-
tion, and end world hunger (Council for Biotechnology
Information, 2001). Environmental groups like
Greenpeace oppose agricultural biotechnology and say
that biotech foods cause allergic reaction, hurt the envi-
ronment, and increase the power of multinational com-
panies (Greenpeace, 2001). Consumer advocates and a
wide range of environmental and food safety groups
have mounted an active campaign against biotech foods.
The average consumer (and farmer) may rely on the
information from these interested parties, both pro and
con, to make their decisions on biotech products.
Huffman and Tegene (2002) have hypothesized that
independent, third-party information improves social
welfare in this environment. According to qualitative and
quantitative research conducted in the United States by
the International Food Information Council (IFIC), con-
sumers accept food biotechnology when the benefits are
effectively communicated (Schmidt, 2002). 
In a recent study, Lin, Chambers, and Harwood (2000)
concluded that “lack of information about the magnitude
of premiums that consumers may be willing to pay for
non-biotech crops makes near-term decisions difficult for
elevators and farmers” (p. 54). This bulletin presents
empirical evidence on U.S. consumers’ willingness to
pay for foods with and without biotech labels using lab-
oratory auction experiments for three food items. In an
experimental auction with divergent information about
risks and benefits, we examined whether consumers
value information provided in biotech labels. Following
Fox, Hayes, and Shogren (2002), we created the diver-
gent information design by providing six combinations
of pro-biotechnology, anti-biotechnology, and third-party
perspectives, which provided their corresponding views
on the scientific impact, human impact, financial impact,
and environmental impact of biotech foods. Iowa State
University (ISU) Statistics Department randomly chose
actual consumers in two major Midwestern U.S. cities.
The consumers were paid to participate in experiments
on food and household products. 
This bulletin examines several issues. First, do biotech
labels have any significant effect on consumers’ willing-
ness to pay for biotech and non-biotech foods? Second,
is consumers’ willingness to pay for biotech foods affect-
ed when they receive information from interested par-
ties? Third, would an independent, third-party group pro-
viding information (e.g., verifiable information) on
biotech foods change consumers’ purchasing behavior?
Finally, do socioeconomic factors (e.g., gender, income,
education) impact the effect of biotech food labels on
consumers’ willingness to pay for food items? 
We applied laboratory experimental auction markets,
along with a statistical design, to answer these questions.
Combining the positive features of statistical experimen-
tal design and auction markets yields a strong experi-
mental design. Experimental auctions have been used to
evaluate consumers’ willingness to pay for food quality
attributes (see, for example, Melton et al., 1996; and
Fox, Hayes, and Shogren, 2002) and food safety (e.g.,
Hayes et al., 1995). Fisher, Wheeler, and Zwick (1993)
surveyed the use of experimental economics in agricul-
tural and resource economics. 
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agriculture and professor of economics, Department of Economics,
Iowa State University; Matthew Rousu is a research economist,
RTI International; and Jason F. Shogren is a Stroock distinguished
professor of natural resource conservation and management,
Department of Economics and Finance, University of Wyoming. 
Labeling is often used to deliver information to con-
sumers on product characteristics that consumers are
not able to evaluate by looking at the product. Whether
a product is produced with the use of biotechnology is
difficult or impossible for the consumer to determine
by looking at the product. However, labeling of biotech
has become one of the most controversial issues in
agriculture today. Currently, the United States does not
require biotech foods to be labeled, unless the new
food product is substantially different from the original
product (the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, FDA,
2001). If the product is substantially different from the
traditional product, the label must identify the differ-
ence, perhaps through a new common name, but the
label does not have to identify the new trait or charac-
teristic as being derived through bioengineering. FDA
requires labeling when the use of biotechnology intro-
duces a known allergen or when it substantially
changes the food’s nutritional content or its composi-
tion (Schmidt, 2002). 
In January 2001, the FDA issued proposed guidance,
not yet finalized, regarding the voluntary labeling of
food containing or not containing bioengineered ingre-
dients. The guidance also clarifies the position of FDA
with regard to the required labeling of products with
new or unique traits, as explained above. However this
proposed guideline does not mention a standard for
what percentage of an ingredient in a food product can
be bioengineered for the product still to be labeled as
non-biotech (FDA, 2001). Two things are of note:
first, the guidance states that FDA considers the term
“genetically modified” and its variants inaccurate,
since all modern foods have been genetically modified
through traditional breeding techniques. According to
FDA and USDA, “bioengineered” or “biotech” are
preferable terms to describe foods produced with the
aid of modern biotechnology. However, the terms
“genetically modified (GM)” and “genetically engi-
neered” are also commonly used to describe biotech
foods in academic publications (see, for example,
AgBio Forum). Since we used the terms “GM” and
“non-GM” in our experimental auctions, we continue
to use them in this bulletin whenever we refer to the
labels in the experimental auctions. Second, FDA con-
siders misleading a voluntary statement such as “bio-
engineered free” on a label, since it may imply that the
labeled food is superior to foods that are not so
labeled. FDA also considers “bioengineered free”
labels to be inaccurate because it implies that a prod-
uct is 100 percent free of biotech components, which
is nearly impossible to guarantee or verify. Examples
of voluntary labels acceptable to the guidance are:
“Genetically engineered,” “This product contains corn-
meal that was produced using biotechnology,” or “This
oil is made from soybeans that were not genetically
engineered” (FDA, 2001). 
The U.S. policy contrasts with the policies of many
other countries, including Australia, China, Japan, and
the countries in the European Union (EU), which all
have mandatory labeling requirements for biotech foods
(Rousu and Huffman, 2001). These countries often have
different levels of bioengineering that they will tolerate
before a product must be labeled as biotech. For exam-
ple, the EU and Australia allow up to 1 percent of any
ingredient in a food product to be bioengineered before
the product must be labeled as biotech. Japan allows 5
percent of any ingredient to be bioengineered before the
product must be labeled as such. 
Caswell (1998 and 2000) has shown that there are
many possible policies that could be implemented,
including mandatory labeling of biotech foods, volun-
tary labeling of biotech and non-biotech foods, bans on
all labeling to indicate whether or not a food is bioengi-
neered, or voluntary labeling of non-biotech foods with
an accompanying disclaimer noting the government’s
judgment about any difference between biotech and
non-biotech foods. Runge and Jackson (2000) propose
the last option as a solution to the current controversy
over labeling of biotech foods. The policies that each
country chooses are likely to be determined by the
information demanded by consumers of each country.
An informed decision on whether or not to implement a
labeling policy on bioengineered foods can only be
done after a benefit/cost analysis. The balance of the
benefit and cost depends on the type of program adopt-
ed (e.g., voluntary, mandatory) and market conditions.
A related issue in the ultimate benefits and costs is how
effectively labels convey information, the certainty of
the labeling (e.g., “does contain” versus “may contain”),
and the ability of the supply chain to provide high levels
of integrity in the segregation process (Caswell, 2000). 
Using the auction results presented in this bulletin,
Huffman et al. (2002) have provided evidence that a
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Issues Related to Labeling
voluntary biotech labeling policy results in greater
societal welfare than regulated mandatory labeling pol-
icy of biotech foods. They argue that United States has
been prudent in fending off calls for a mandatory
biotech labeling policy. 
Benefits of Labeling
Consumer groups and environmental groups have
argued that there are benefits for consumers from
mandatory labeling of biotech foods. Some groups
(e.g., Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth) advocate that
labels on biotech foods give consumers the right to
choose whether or not to consume biotech foods. 
Golan, Kuchler, and Mitchell (2000) have analyzed the
potential benefits of general labels on foods. One ben-
efit is making it easy to find information, e.g., on
nutritional content of foods. Thus, labeling of foods
can lead to more informed food choices by consumers. 
Caswell and Padberg (1992) recommend a more com-
prehensive view of the benefits of any labels on food
products. The benefits can be above and beyond what
are normally considered the typical benefits from
labels. The benefits from food labels include increased
consumer information and more consumer confidence
in product quality. Also, labels can provide an option
value, even for consumers who do not currently read
food labels. This option value exists because if a food
is labeled, consumers always have the option to view
the label, either now or in the future. 
Runge and Jackson (2000) argue that negative labeling
(e.g., “This product was not genetically engineered”)
has advantages for both consumers and producers.
Drawing lessons from the Recombinant Bovine
Somatotropin (rBST) experience, they argue that adop-
tion of negative labeling can create significant niche
markets for producers and that a carefully designed
negative label would avoid the potential information
biases of the positive label system.
Costs of Labeling
While there might be benefits to labeling, implement-
ing a labeling policy involves some costs. The cost of
labeling involves far more than the paper and ink to
print the actual labels. Biotechnology firms oppose
mandatory labeling for all biotech foods because they
do not think foods should be specially labeled unless
the food is different from the conventional product
(Council of Biotechnology Information, 2001). The
labels on a biotech food could be taken as a warning
about health, whereas no significant health-related dif-
ferences between biotech and non-biotech foods have
been detected. 
Golan, Kuchler, and Mitchell (2000) listed many costs
associated with implementing a general food labeling
policy. Some of the costs if a mandatory labeling poli-
cy is enacted include:
(1) Cost of identity preservation: Accurate label-
ing requires an extensive identity preservation
system from farmer to elevator to grain
processors to food manufacturers to retailers.
When separating biotech from non-biotech
foods, mistakes in delivery of the product are
always a possibility, as is accidental mingling
of non-biotech crops with their biotech coun-
terparts. For example, in the United States,
biotech corn, known as Starlink, was not
approved for human consumption, but got into
U.S. food system. Under identity preservation,
farmers must ensure that non-biotech crops are
not mingled with biotech variety. Farmers
need to develop buffer zones to ensure no
cross-pollination of biotech and non-biotech
crops. Farmers also need to make sure plant-
ing and harvesting equipment are cleaned
between biotech and non-biotech varieties. All
of these items imply real costs if a labeling
policy is implemented.
(2) Higher consumer prices: These added labeling
and segregation costs would lead to higher
prices for consumers (and possibly lower
prices to producers). Higher prices could cause
a regressive tax for lower income households,
because low-income households spend a larger
share of their income for food than do high-
income households. In addition to low-income
persons’ having to pay for labeled food, the
poor and less educated are less likely to bene-
fit from food labels. This might lead to a
“reverse Robin Hood effect” of taking money
from the poor to benefit the rich (Golan,
Kuchler, and Mitchell, 2000). Furthermore, the
costs would be borne by all consumers regard-
less of the level of their own concerns.
(3) Costs to the agricultural industry: Some argue
that labels could impose costs on the food and
agricultural industry without providing compen-
sating benefits to consumers. Labels could steer
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consumers away from biotech products, which
would lead to reduced consumption and trade,
and investment in research and marketing in
biotechnology and their products may be signif-
icantly diminished (Runge and Jackson, 2000).
Also, Golan, Kuchler, and Mitchell (2000) sug-
gest that labeling could change industry struc-
ture. With some fixed costs associated with
labeling, small firms may have higher per-unit
labeling costs than large firms. This would
mean increasing returns to scale, and an incen-
tive for firms to grow, or close down. A labeling
policy that decreases the number of firms could
decrease competition and might increase prices
for consumers. Firms could also face reformu-
lation costs. 
(4) Adverse effect on information: Adding more
information to food labels may dilute con-
sumer awareness of other information on the
label (Golan, Kuchler, and Mitchell, 2000).
This concern seems most important when the
labeling policy being considered would inform
consumers of an attribute that may not impact
human health, e.g., bioengineering. 
(5) Cost of verification: Labeling without independ-
ent verification is not likely to be useful. Hence,
a new labeling policy would require resources
for government or third-party verification.
There are relatively few cost estimates due to labeling
of biotech foods. An ERS study, based on a survey of
84 elevators, estimates that segregation of non-biotech
crops could add about $0.22 per bushel and $0.54 per
bushel to marketing costs for corn and soybeans,
respectively (Lin, Chambers, and Harwood, 2000).
These estimates do not include the premium to produc-
ers. These cost estimates reflect average costs to the ele-
vators only and do not take into account additional costs
associated with segregation at the farm level.
A study commissioned by the Canadian government
estimates that mandatory labeling of bioengineered
foods would increase food prices a minimum of 9 to 10
percent (Byrne, 2002). This means, for example, that a
tortilla costing $1.50 would increase to about $1.65. 
Australia and New Zealand commissioned KPMG, an
accounting and consulting firm, to examine the costs
of complying with a new labeling law. KPMG estimat-
ed that the costs of the labeling laws could mean an
increase in consumer prices from 0.5 to 15 percent,
and that firms could also face lower profits (Phillips
and Foster, 2000). Even though they commissioned the
study, the Australian and New Zealand Food Standard
Council did not accept these estimates because the
study assumed a much more elaborate system of pri-
vate certification/testing and government oversight
than the Council envisioned (Caswell, 2000). Updated
estimates are being prepared. Phillips and Smyth
(2000) estimated that, in 1995-96, a voluntary identity-
preserved production and marketing system in Canada
cost from 13 to 15 percent. One thing seems apparent;
implementing a labeling policy on biotech foods
would not be cost free, even if the exact magnitude of
the cost is unknown. 
Divergent Information
When the first biotech food product, a tomato engi-
neered for longer shelf life, was released in the United
States, it was accompanied by information in the
media and at the markets, which increased familiarity
of this new technology. However, commodity crops,
such as corn and soybeans with altered agronomic
traits, have subsequently been released without much
media coverage (Shoemaker, 2001), although they
received the same amount of public notification as all
other regulations related to food safety. While there
may not be any cause for concern about the safety of
biotech foods, some consumers object to consuming
food produced with any technology that lacks a long,
established history of use. In addition, food labeling
has become an issue of consumers’ “right to know”
(Shoemaker, 2001). At the same time, consumer and
environmental groups on one side and agribusiness
and biotech firms on the other side provide consumers
with conflicting information about the benefits and
risks of agricultural biotechnology. Also, bioengineer-
ing is a complex process and most people do not know
the intricate details of this process (see, for example,
FDA’s report on focus groups, FDA, 2000). With dif-
ferent sources giving information to consumers, what
are consumers likely to do? Studies by the
International Food Information Council (IFIC) have
shown the importance of the source of biotechnology
information to consumers. “Who is educating con-
sumers, not just the education itself, has emerged as a
crucial factor to acceptance [of biotech foods]”
(Schmidt, 2002).
Viscusi (1997) studied consumer reaction to environ-
mental risks from air pollution emissions from chemical
factories. He showed that when consumers receive
divergent information on environmental risks, they tend
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to put a greater weight on the high-risk assessment. The
individual’s reaction was similar for information from
both government and industry sources of information. 
Fox, Hayes, and Shogren (2002) examined the effects
of positive and negative information on consumers’
willingness to pay for irradiated pork sandwiches.
They found that when consumers were presented with
both positive and negative information on food irradia-
tion, the negative information dominated the con-
sumers’ decision-making. This was despite the fact
that the negative information source was identified as a
consumer advocacy group, and the information was
written in a non-scientific manner. 
Recent research shows that there may be a need for
third-party, verifiable information on biotech foods, so
consumers do not have to rely on the information from
biotechnology companies and environmental groups
(Huffman and Tegene, 2000). Research on organic
foods reached a similar conclusion, in that there may
be benefits from an independent, third-party monitor
to help reduce false claims by interested parties
(McClusky, 2000). 
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An experiment was designed to incorporate the private-
information-revealing feature of experimental auction
markets and the rigorous randomized treatment effects
of statistical experimental design.2 The experimental
design consisted of six biotech information-labeling
treatments with two replications. The treatments were
randomly assigned to 12 experimental units, each con-
sisting of 13-16 consumers drawn from the households
of two major urban areas. Consumers were paid to par-
ticipate. At the suggestion of the statisticians, each par-
ticipant participated in only two trials.3 Using randomly
chosen consumers from the population of an urban area,
rather than undergraduate college students at a universi-
ty, is a major advantage when drawing inferences from
the experiments or generalizing to the Midwest or
whole U.S. population. Conducting experiments in two
urban areas rather than one enhances credibility of gen-
eralizations and shows that the experiments can be
replicated across urban areas. 
Consumers might react differently to biotech content
in different types of food, or they may have no
demand for some food products. Hence, using only
one food item seemed unlikely to reveal enough infor-
mation, given the sizeable fixed cost of conducting the
experiments. Three food items were chosen: vegetable
oil (made from soybeans), tortilla chips (made from
yellow corn), and Russet potatoes. In the distilling and
refining process for vegetable oils, essentially all of
the proteins (which are the components of DNA and
the source of bioengineering) are removed, leaving
pure lipids. Hence, minimal human health concerns
should arise from biotech oil, but consumers may
worry that biotech soybeans affect the environment or
that they lack adequate information on the distilling
process. Tortilla chips are highly processed foods that
may be made from biotech or non-biotech corn, and
consumers might have human health and environmen-
tal concerns. Russet potatoes are purchased as a fresh
product and are generally baked or fried before eating.
Consumers might see both human health and environ-
mental risks from eating biotech Russet potatoes. 
Random nth-price auction
Auctions have been a popular mechanism in laboratory
valuation experiments by economists. In particular,
Vickrey’s (1961) second-price auction has been used
frequently. The second-price auction induces individu-
als to reveal private information contained in their
preferences for new goods and services (Shogren et
al., 1994; Fox et al., 1998; and Shogren, List, and
Hayes, 2000). The popularity of the second-price auc-
tion is largely due to the mechanism’s being demand
revealing in theory and relatively simple to explain,
and it has an endogenous market-clearing price. In the
second-price auction, bids (sealed) for a good are
ranked from highest to lowest, and the winner pays the
second highest price. Participants have an incentive to
tell the truth about their valuation for a good because
the auction separates what they say from what they
pay. Sincere bidding is the weakly dominant strategy
(Shogren, List, and Hayes, 2000). Further, evidence
from induced value experiments suggests the auction
mechanism can produce efficient outcomes in the
aggregate (Kagel, 1995).
The second-price auction, however, has a problem: it
does not accurately reveal the complete demand curve
for a good by all participants. Individuals whose value
for a good is far below or above the market-clearing
price frequently bid insincerely. Bidders whose values
are far below or above the market-clearing price are
called off-the-margin bidders (Shogren et al., 2001).
These bidders have a low opportunity cost from an
insincere bid, making it difficult to accurately measure
the entire demand curve. A second-price auction might
not engage low-value bidders who think they will
never lose by insincere bidding (see Miller and Plott,
1985, and Franciosi et al., 1993). Insincere bidding
can be sustained if the behavior is undetected and
unpunished by the institutional structure of the auction
mechanism (see Cherry et al., 2000).
We chose the random nth price auction for our biotech-
food experiment because it is designed to engage both
the on- and off-the-margin bidders (see Shogren et al.,
2001). The auction combines elements of two classic
demand-revealing mechanisms: the second-price auc-
tion and the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (1964) random
pricing mechanism. The key characteristic of the ran-
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Experimental Design
2 Phil Dixon and Wayne Fuller, Department of Statistics, Iowa
State University, provided assistance with the statistical design part
of the project.
3 This is in contrast to the tradition in experimental economics of
having an individual participate in multiple trials. See Shogren
(forthcoming).
dom nth price auction is that it is a random but endoge-
nously determined market-clearing price. Randomness
is used to give all participants a positive probability of
being a purchaser of the auctioned good; the endoge-
nous price guarantees that the market-clearing price is
related to the bidder’s private values. 
The random nth price works as follows. Each of k bid-
ders submits a bid for one unit of a good; then each of
the bids is rank ordered from highest to lowest. The
auction monitor then selects a random number—the n
in the nth-price auction—which is drawn from a uni-
form distribution between 2 and k; and the monitor
sells one unit of the good to each of the (n-1) highest
bidders at the nth price. For instance, if the monitor
randomly selects n = 4, the three highest bidders each
purchase one unit of the good priced at the fourth-
highest bid. Ex ante, bidders who have low or moder-
ate valuations now have a nontrivial chance to buy the
good because the price is determined randomly. This
auction increases the odds that insincere bidding will
lead to a loss (Shogren et al., 2001).
The Experiments
Auctions were planned and conducted at two
Midwestern U.S. cities: Des Moines, IA, and St. Paul,
MN. The Iowa State University (ISU) Statistics
Laboratory obtained 1,200-1,500 randomly selected
residence telephone numbers from each of the metro-
politan areas. Employees of the ISU Statistics
Laboratory called these numbers to make sure that the
phone number was for a residence. The employees
then asked to speak to an adult (18 years or older) in
the household. They were told that Iowa State
University was looking for people who were willing to
participate in a group session in Des Moines (St. Paul)
that relates to how people select food and household
products. The ISU Statistics Laboratory contacted con-
sumers in these two areas who agreed to participate in
the study. The sessions were held on two different
Saturdays (April 7 and 21) in 2001, and participants
were informed that the session would last about 90
minutes. Each participant was told that he or she
would receive $40 in cash for his or her time. The ses-
sions were held at the Iowa State University Learning
Connection, 7th and Locust Street, Des Moines (lower
level of the Classroom Office Building, University of
Minnesota, St. Paul). Three different times were avail-
able each auction day—9 a.m., 11:30 a.m., and 2 p.m.
Willing participants chose a time that best fit their
schedule. Participation per household was limited to
two adults, and they were assigned to different
groups.4 The Statistics Laboratory sent participants a
letter containing more information, including a map, a
meeting time and location, and a telephone number to
contact for more information.
There were 12 experimental units—six in Des Moines
and six in Minneapolis. Ninety-nine people in Des
Moines agreed to participate out of 1,200 called. Of
the 99 who agreed to participate, 77 actually attended.
For the Minneapolis experiments, 118 people, out of
1,500 called, agreed to participate. Of those 118, 95
participated. The sample size totaled 172, which is
large compared to most experimental auctions.
Each auction had 10 steps, which are summarized in
figure 1.5 Upon arrival at the experiment, participants
signed a consent form agreeing to participate in the
auction. After they signed this form, the participants
were given $40 for participating and an ID number (to
preserve their anonymity). The participants then read a
brief set of instructions and filled out a questionnaire. 
In step 2, participants were given detailed instructions
on the random nth-price auction, including an example
written on the board. After the participants learned
about the auction, a short quiz was given to ensure that
everyone understood how the auction worked. 
Step 3 was the first practice round of bidding, during
which participants bid on a brand-name candy bar. The
participants were asked to examine the product and then
place a bid (sealed) on the candy bar. The bids were col-
lected and the first round of practice bidding ended.
Throughout the auctions, as the participants bid on items
in a particular round, they had no indication of what
other items they might be bidding on in future rounds.
Step 4 was the second practice round of bidding. In
this round, the participants bid separately on three dif-
ferent items. The three products were the same brand-
name candy bar, a deck of playing cards, and a box of
pens. The consumers were asked to examine the three
products in practice round two and make bids on the
products. Then the bids were collected. Only one of
the two rounds was chosen as binding (valid), so that
participants would not take home more than one of
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4 When two adults in a household participated, the Iowa State
Statistics Laboratory talked to both adults separately to obtain a com-
mitment to participate; and the adults were told that they would be
assigned to different groups.
5 The complete set of information given to participants may be
requested from the authors.
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Figure 1
Steps in the experiment
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3
nth-price auction is
explained
Auction of a candy
bar, a deck of cards,
and a box of pens
Binding practice
round and binding nth
prices are revealed
Second round of bid-
ding on food products
Post-auction ques-
tionnaire; winning
people purchase
goods
Binding food round
and binding nth
prices are revealed
First round of bidding
on food products
Pro-biotechnology
Anti-biotechnology
Both Pro- and Anti-biotech-
nology
Pro-biotechnology and third-
party information
Both Pro- and Anti-biotechnol-
ogy and third-party information
Anti-biotechnology and third-
party information
Candy bar auction
Step 5
Step 4
Step 6
Step 7
Step 9
Step 8
Step 10
Fills consent form and
questionnaire; receives
$40 and I.D. number
any product. The reason was to eliminate price reduc-
tion due to the consumer’s buying a larger quantity
because of diminishing marginal utility of these prod-
ucts (i.e., lower prices due to a consumer’s negatively
sloped demand curve).6 Participants were informed
that only one of the two rounds would bind before step
3 and were reminded of this again before step 4. 
After the two practice auction rounds were completed,
the binding round and the binding nth prices were
revealed in step 5. All of the bids were written on the
board, and the nth prices were circled for each of the
three products. This way, participants could see what
items they had won (bought) immediately, and what
price they had to pay for the items. The participants
were notified that all purchases of goods would take
place after the experiment was over, so that all
exchanges of money for goods would take place at the
end of the session.
In step 6, participants received one of six potential
information packets about biotechnology. The infor-
mation packets were produced as follows. Three pack-
ets of information contained:
(1) the industry perspective—a collection of
statements and information on biotechnology
provided by a group of leading biotechnology
companies, including Monsanto and
Syngenta; 
(2) the environmental group perspective—a col-
lection of statements and information on
biotechnology from Greenpeace, a leading
environmental group; 
(3) the independent, third-party group perspec-
tive—a statement on biotechnology
approved by a third-party group, consisting
of a variety of individuals knowledgeable
about biotech foods, including scientists,
professionals, religious leaders, and academ-
ics, none of whom have a financial stake in
genetically modified foods. 
To assist the participants’ processing of these different
sources of information, the volume of information
released of each type was limited to one page. To ease
the information-processing load on participants, the
information was organized into five categories: gener-
al information, scientific impact, human impact, finan-
cial impact, and environmental impact. Figures 2-4
show the exact format and wording of the three infor-
mation sources.
The information was randomized to create the six
information packets: (1) pro-biotechnology; (2) anti-
biotechnology; (3) both pro- and anti-biotechnology;
(4) pro-biotechnology and third-party verifiable infor-
mation; (5) anti-biotechnology and third-party7 verifi-
able information; and (6) pro-biotechnology, anti-
biotechnology, and third-party verifiable information.
The 6 information packets were then randomized
among all 12 experimental units, with each informa-
tion packet going to 2 experimental units. When a par-
ticipant received both pro-biotechnology and anti-
biotechnology information, the order was randomized,
so that some participants received the pro-biotechnolo-
gy information first, and others received the anti-
biotechnology information first.
Two auction rounds followed the distribution of informa-
tion. The rounds were differentiated by the food label—
the food had either a standard label or a biotech label. In
one of the rounds, participants bid on the three food
products each with just a standard food label. In the
other round, participants would be bidding on the same
three food products with a biotech label, which differed
from the standard label by inclusion of only one extra
sentence: “This product is made using genetic modifica-
tion (GM).” (As noted earlier, USDA and FDA prefer
the terms “biotech” or “bio-engineered” to “GM,”
although “GM” and non-“GM” are commonly used in
academic publications, e.g., AgBio Forum.) These labels
were made as plain as possible to avoid any influence on
the bids from the label design. The labels are presented
in figure 5. The sequencing of biotech labels was ran-
domized across experimental units. Each information
packet was given to two experimental units (fig. 6). One
of these experimental units bid on food with the standard
label in round one, and the food with the label indicating
bioengineering in round two. The other experimental
unit bid on food with the label indicating bioengineering
in round one, and the standard label in round two (fig.
6). For each experimental unit, participants knew that
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6 If one assumes that there is little or no income effect from the deck
of cards and box of pens, the two bids on the candy bars should be
the same. If the deck of cards and box of pens are neither comple-
ments nor substitutes for the candy bar, they should not impact the
bids on the candy bar.
7 Third-party information was always distributed after the other
information sources.
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Figure 2
Information given to participants, industry perspective (pro-biotechnology)
The following is a collection of statements and information on genetic modification provided by a group 
of leading biotechnology companies, including Monsanto and Syngenta.
General Information Genetically modified plants and animals have the potential to be one of the 
greatest discoveries in the history of farming. Improvements in crops so far 
relate to improved insect and disease resistance and weed control. These 
improvements using bioengineering/GM technology lead to reduced cost of 
food production. Future GM food products may have health benefits.
Scientific Impact Genetic modification is a technique that has been used to produce food 
products that are approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
Genetic engineering has brought new opportunities to farmers for pest control 
and in the future will provide consumers with nutrient enhanced foods. GM 
plants and animals have the potential to be the single greatest discovery in the 
history of agriculture. We have just seen the tip of the iceberg of future potential.
Human Impact The health benefits from genetic modification can be enormous. A special type 
of rice called “golden rice” has already been created which has higher levels of 
vitamin A. This could be very helpful because the disease Vitamin A Deficiency 
(VAD) is devastating in third-world countries. VAD causes irreversible blindness 
in over 500,000 children, and is also responsible for over one million deaths 
annually. Since rice is the staple food in the diets of millions of people in the 
third world, Golden Rice has the potential of improving millions of lives a year by 
reducing the cases of VAD.
The FDA has approved GM food for human consumption, and Americans have 
been consuming GM foods for years. While every food product may pose risks, 
there has never been a documented case of a person getting sick from GM food.
Financial Impact Genetically modified plants have reduced the cost of food production, which 
means lower food prices, and that can help feed the world. In America, lower 
food prices help decrease the number of hungry people and also lets consumers 
save a little more money on food. Worldwide the number of hungry people has 
been declining, but increased crop production using GM technology can also 
help further reduce world hunger.
Environmental Impact GM technology has produced new methods of insect control that reduce 
chemical insecticide application by 50 percent or more. This means less 
environmental damage. GM weed control is providing new methods to control 
weeds, which are a special problem in no-till farming. Genetic modification of 
plants has the potential to be one of the most environmentally helpful 
discoveries ever.
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Figure 3
Information given to participants, environmental group perspective (anti-biotechnology)
The following is a collection of statements and information on genetic modification from Greenpeace, a leading
environmental group.
General Information Genetic modification is one of the most dangerous things being done to your 
food sources today. There are many reasons that genetically modified foods 
should be banned, mainly because unknown adverse effects could be 
catastrophic! Inadequate safety testing of GM plants, animals, and food products 
has occurred, so humans are the ones testing whether or not GM foods are 
safe. Consumers should not have to test new food products to ensure that they 
are safe.
Scientific Impact The process of genetic modification takes genes from one organism and puts 
them into another. This process is very risky. The biggest potential hazard of 
genetically modified (GM) foods is the unknown. This is a relatively new 
technique, and no one can guarantee that consumers will not be harmed.
Recently, many governments in Europe assured consumers that there would be 
no harm to consumers over mad-cow disease, but unfortunately, their claims 
were wrong. We do not want consumers to be harmed by GM food.
Human Impact Genetically modified foods could pose major health problems. The potential 
exists for allergens to be transferred to a GM food product that no one would 
suspect. For example, if genes from a peanut were transferred into a tomato, 
and someone who is allergic to peanuts eats this new tomato, they could display 
a peanut allergy.
Another problem with genetically modified foods is a moral issue. These foods 
are taking genes from one living organism and transplanting them into another.
Many people think it is morally wrong to mess around with life forms on such a 
fundamental level.
Financial Impact GM foods are being pushed onto consumers by big businesses, which care only 
about their own profits and ignore possible negative side effects. These groups 
are actually patenting different life forms that they genetically modify, with plans 
to sell them in the future. Studies have also shown that GM crops may get lower 
yields than conventional crops.
Environmental Impact Genetically modified foods could pose major environmental hazards. Sparse 
testing of GM plants for environmental impacts has occurred. One potential 
hazard could be the impact of GM crops on wildlife. One study showed that one 
type of GM plant killed Monarch butterflies.
Another potential environmental hazard could come from pests that begin to 
resist GM plants that were engineered to reduce chemical pesticide application.
The harmful insects and other pests that get exposed to these crops could 
quickly develop tolerance and wipe out many of the potential advantages of GM 
pest resistance.
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Figure 4
Information given to participants, third-party perspective (independent, verifiable information) 
The following is a statement on genetic modification approved by a third-party group, consisting of a variety of 
individuals knowledgeable about genetically modified foods, including scientists, professionals, religious leaders,
and academics. These parties have no financial stake in genetically modified foods.
General Information Bioengineering is a type of genetic modification where genes are transferred 
across plants or animals, a process that would not otherwise occur (In common 
usage, genetic modification means bioengineering). With bioengineered pest 
resistance in plants, the process is somewhat similar to the process of how a flu 
shot works in the human body. Flu shots work by injecting a virus into the body 
to help make a human body more resistant to the flu. Bioengineered plant-pest 
resistance causes a plant to enhance its own pest resistance.
Scientific Impact The Food and Drug Administration standards for GM food products (chips, 
cereals, potatoes, etc.) is based on the principle that they have essentially the 
same ingredients, although they have been modified slightly from the original 
plant materials.
Oils made from bioengineered oil crops have been refined, and this process 
removed essentially all the GM proteins, making them like non-GM oils. So even 
if GM crops were deemed to be harmful for human consumption, it is doubtful 
that vegetable oils would cause harm.
Human Impact While many genetically modified foods are in the process of being put on your 
grocers’ shelf, there are currently no foods available in the U.S. where genetic 
modification has increased nutrient content.
All foods present a small risk of an allergic reaction to some people. No FDA 
approved GM food poses any known unique human health risks.
Financial Impact Genetically modified seeds and other organisms are produced by businesses 
that seek profits. For farmers to switch to GM crops, they must see benefits from 
the switch. However, genetic modification technology may lead to changes in the 
organization of the agri-business industry and farming. The introduction of GM 
foods has the potential to decrease the prices to consumers for groceries.
Environmental Impact The effects of genetic modification on the environment are largely unknown.
Bioengineered insect resistance has reduced farmers’ applications of environ-
mentally hazardous insecticides. More studies are occurring to help assess the 
impact of bioengineered plants and organisms on the environment. A couple of 
studies reported harm to Monarch butterflies from GM crops, but other scientists 
were not able to recreate the results. The possibility of insects growing resistant 
to GM crops is a legitimate concern.
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Figure 5
Labels used for the three food items
Vegetable Oil
Net weight 32 fl. oz.
Tortilla Chips
Net weight 16 oz.
Fresh made Thursday April 5th
Russet Potatoes
Net weight 5 lb.
Tortilla Chips
Net weight 16 oz.
Fresh made Thursday April 5th
This product is made using
genetic modification (GM)
Vegetable Oil
Net weight 32 fl. oz.
This product is made using
genetically modified (GM) soybeans
Russet Potatoes
Net weight 5 lb.
This product is made using
genetic modification (GM)
Figure 6
Information and labeling given to experimental units one through twelve
Exp. unit Positive/negative Third-party Round with “GM” labels
1. Pro-biotech Yes 1
2. Anti-biotech Yes 1
3. Pro-biotech, anti-biotech Yes 1
4. Pro-biotech Yes 2
5. Anti-biotech Yes 2
6. Pro-biotech, anti-biotech Yes 2
7. Pro-biotech No 1
8. Anti-biotech No 1
9. Pro-biotech and anti-biotech No 1
10. Pro-biotech No 2
11. Anti-biotech No 2
12. Pro-biotech and anti-biotech No 2
only one of the two food rounds would be chosen as the
binding (valid) round.
In step 7, participants bid on three different food prod-
ucts: a bag of potatoes, a bottle of vegetable oil, and a
bag of tortilla chips. The participants were instructed
to examine the three products and then write down
their (sealed) bid for each of the three goods.
Participants bid on each good separately. Then the bids
were collected from the individuals, and the partici-
pants were informed that they were about to look at
another group of food items.
Step 8 had participants examine the same three food
products, but each with a different label from round 1.
Again the participants examined the products and bid
on the three products separately. The bids were then
collected from all of the participants. Once again, con-
sumers were informed that only one of the two food
rounds would be binding.8
Step 9 selected the binding round and the binding nth
prices for the three goods. After the binding round and
binding nth prices were chosen, the winners were noti-
fied and all participants were asked to fill out a brief
post-auction questionnaire. In step 10, the participants
who did not win any products were informed that they
could leave; the participants who had won products
exchanged their goods for money, and were then free
to leave. 
The Data 
A summary of the demographic characteristics of the
172 auction participants is presented in table 1. Sixty-
two percent of the participants in the auctions were
female. The mean age of the participants was 49.5 years
(a person had to be at least 18 years old to participate).
Two-thirds of the auction participants were married. On
average, the participants were well educated, with the
mean education level being more than 2 years in college.
The participants had a mean total household income
(before taxes) of $57,000, with an average household
size of three. Ninety percent of the participants in the
experiments were white, and most people indicated that
they read labels before they buy a new food product.
Some participants chose to bid zero in both trials, i.e.,
for both the “GM”-labeled and the plain-labeled vari-
ety of a particular food product. These participants
provide no information about their taste for biotech
foods; they were willing to pay zero for one unit, a
small demand. Table 2 presents the mean bids for par-
ticipants, segregated by information treatment, but
does not include bids for consumers who bid zero for
both the “GM”-labeled and plain-labeled varieties of a
product.9 In table 2, the number of participants who
bid a positive amount for a product is different for
each of the three goods. This occurs because more
consumers bid zero for the “GM”-labeled and plain-
labeled vegetable oils than for the “GM”-labeled and
plain-labeled bags of tortilla chips. “GM”-labeled and
plain-labeled bags of potatoes had the largest number
of non-zero bids. Many consumers who bid zero for
both the biotech and non-biotech varieties of one prod-
uct bid a positive amount for the other products.10
The Effect of Information
Part A of table 2 addresses the question, “Do labels
have any significant effect on consumers’ willingness
to pay for biotech and non-biotech foods?” Part A of
table 2 shows the mean bid prices for all participants
for each of the three products: the 5-pound bag of
potatoes, the 32-ounce bottle of vegetable oil, and the
1-pound bag of tortilla chips. Under all information
treatments and all auctions, consumers, on average,
discounted food items labeled “GM” by 14 percent.11
Thus, “GM” labels affect consumers’ willingness to
pay for “GM” and plain-labeled food products. It is
possible that participants might have perceived the
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8 These experiments were set up to minimize endowment effects;
i.e., participants were endowed at the beginning of the experiment
with $40 but not GM-food. See Shogren (forthcoming) for evi-
dence on endowment effects.
9 The percentage discount of foods is similar to the percentage
when all bids are included.
10 Only 7 of the 172 participants bid zero for all six products.
11 In another similar experiment (Huffman et al., 2002), 142 con-
sumers in Des Moines and Minnesota participated in auctions for the
same 3 food products. There were 2 labeling regimes: (1) 86 con-
sumers participated in plain-labeled and “GM”-labeled products; and
(2) 56 consumers participated in plain-labeled and non-“GM”-labeled
products. We examined the difference in bids for the “perceived” GM
product to the “perceived” non-GM product. In (1), the GM-labeled
was the perceived GM product while the plain-labeled was assumed
to be the perceived non-GM product. In (2), the plain-labeled food
was assumed the perceived GM product while the non-GM product
was the perceived non-GM product. Statistical tests showed that con-
sumers’ bid for the perceived non-GM products in the auctions
(labeling regimes 1 and 2) are not different. That is, consumers dis-
counted perceived GM foods similarly in the two auctions. In this
experiment, all participants received positive and negative informa-
tion while some participants received third-party information.
plain-labeled products as non-biotech when comparing
the “GM”-labeled and plain-labeled food products. 
Table 2, parts B-G, shows how consumers’ willingness
to pay for “GM”-labeled and plain-labeled foods is
affected by divergent information about the benefits
and risk associated with biotechnology. Part B shows
that participants who received only positive informa-
tion actually put a premium on the “GM”-labeled food
for two of the three products. This was despite the fact
that biotechnology was only used to enhance the agro-
nomic traits and did not give the foods any enhanced
attributes. Part C shows that when consumers received
only negative information, they discounted the “GM”-
labeled foods by an average of 35 percent. Part D
shows that consumers who received both positive and
negative information discounted the “GM”-labeled
foods by an average of 16-29 percent, depending on
the food product.
Third-party information has an impact on the willingness
to pay for “GM”-labeled foods. Part E shows that con-
sumers who received positive and third-party informa-
tion discounted “GM”-labeled foods slightly. This is in
contrast to the consumers who received only positive
information and valued the “GM”-labeled foods more
than their plain-labeled counterpart on average. Part F
shows that participants who received negative and third-
party information still discounted the “GM”-labeled
foods, but by a smaller amount than the participants who
received only negative information. Participants who
received negative and third-party information discounted
the “GM”-labeled foods by an average of 17-22 percent,
depending on the product. Part G shows that participants
who received positive, negative, and third-party informa-
tion were more accepting of the “GM”-labeled foods
than those who received only positive and negative infor-
mation. The participants who received positive, negative,
and third-party information discounted the “GM”-
labeled food by an average of 0-11 percent, depending
on the product. Figures 7-9 show the average bids for
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Table 1—Characteristics of the auction participants
Variable Definition Mean Standard deviation
Gender 1 if female 0.62 0.49
Age The participant’s age 49.5 17.5
Married 1 if the individual is married 0.67 0.47
Education Years of schooling 14.54 2.25
Household Number of people in participant’s household 2.78 1.65
Income The household’s income level (in thousands) 57.0 32.6
White 1 if participant is white 0.90 0.30
Read  1 if never read labels before a new food purchase 0.01 0.11
1 if rarely read labels before a new food purchase 0.11 0.31
1 if sometimes read labels before a new food purchase 0.31 0.46
1 if often read labels before a new food purchase 0.37 0.48
1 if always read labels before a new food purchase 0.20 0.40
Informed 1 if an individual considered themselves at least
somewhat informed regarding genetically modified foods 0.42 0.49
Labels 1 1 if the participant bid on foods with GM labels in round 1 0.52 0.50
Figure 7
Oil:  Mean bids for GM-labeled and  
standard-labeled foods
Dollars
Note: A = only positive information; B = only negative information;  
C = both positive and negative information; D = both positive  
and third-party information; E = both negative and third-party  
information; and F = positive, negative, and third-party information.     
0
0.4
0.8
1.2
1.6
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Table 2—Mean bids for participants receiving positive, negative, and third-party information 
excluding double-zero bids
A. Mean bids – all participants
n mean bid std dev Median Minimum Maximum
Biotech oil 146 1.07 0.81 0.99 0 3.99
Oil 146 1.24 0.78 1.00 0 3.79
Biotech chips 155 1.03 0.85 0.99 0 3.99
Chips 155 1.20 0.81 1.00 0.05 4.99
Biotech potatoes 159 0.84 0.66 0.75 0 3
Potatoes 159 0.98 0.65 0.89 0 3.89
B. Mean bids when participants received only positive information
n mean bid std dev Median Minimum Maximum
Biotech oil 26 1.56 0.73 1.50 0 2.99
Oil 26 1.54 0.79 1.55 0 3.50
Biotech chips 30 1.31 0.72 1.13 0 2.99
Chips 30 1.36 0.72 1.18 0.05 2.99
Biotech potatoes  27 1.30 0.71 1.25 0 2.50
Potatoes 27 1.26 0.67 1.25 0 2.00
C. Mean bids when participants received only negative information
n mean bid std dev Median Minimum Maximum
Biotech oil 26 0.79 0.82 0.50 0 3.25
Oil 26 1.22 0.65 1.00 0.25 2.49
Biotech chips 29 0.81 0.94 0.50 0 3.99
Chips 29 1.25 1.02 1.00 0.05 4.99
Biotech potatoes  29 0.61 0.68 0.50 0 2.75
Potatoes 29 0.98 0.88 0.75 0.05 3.89
D. Mean bids when participants received both positive and negative information
n mean bid std dev Median Minimum Maximum
Biotech oil 24 0.68 0.55 0.50 0 1.79
Oil 24 0.90 0.72 0.85 0 3.00
Biotech chips 23 0.68 0.74 0.35 0 2.25
Chips 23 0.81 0.79 0.49 0.05 2.75
Biotech potatoes  26 0.50 0.39 0.50 0 1.50
Potatoes 26 0.70 0.43 0.50 0.05 1.60
Continued--
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Table 2—Mean bids for participants receiving positive, negative, and third-party information 
excluding double-zero bids--Continued
E. Mean bids when participants received both positive and third-party information
n mean bid std dev Median Minimum Maximum
Biotech oil 26 1.12 0.62 1.00 0 2.39
Oil 26 1.14 0.57 1.00 0.10 2.39
Biotech chips 25 1.24 0.77 1.19 0 2.79
Chips 25 1.33 0.73 1.16 0.20 2.89
Biotech potatoes 26 0.92 0.45 0.99 0 1.85
Potatoes 26 0.93 0.39 0.99 0.25 1.90
F. Mean bids when participants received both negative and third-party information
n mean bid std dev Median Minimum Maximum
Biotech oil 21 1.33 1.05 1.25 0 3.99
Oil 21 1.60 0.97 1.50 0.49 3.79
Biotech chips 25 1.12 0.97 0.99 0 3.50
Chips 25 1.38 0.77 1.01 0.49 3.00
Biotech potatoes  27 0.89 0.77 0.89 0 3.00
Potatoes 27 1.14 0.67 0.99 0.50 3.00
G. Mean bids when participants received positive, negative, and third-party information
n mean bid std dev Median Minimum Maximum
Biotech oil 23 0.94 0.77 0.95 0 2.75
Oil 23 1.06 0.82 1.00 0.05 3.29
Biotech chips 23 0.95 0.81 0.85 0 3.25
Chips 23 0.95 0.66 0.99 0.1 2.89
Biotech potatoes  24 0.82 0.61 1.00 0 1.99
Potatoes 24 0.84 0.55 0.84 0.01 2.00
“GM”-labeled and plain-labeled foods when participants
are given divergent information. 
Our results as well as Viscusi’s (1997) indicated that
individuals placed a slightly greater weight on negative
information than on positive information. In our auc-
tion, those who received only positive information did
not discount the “GM”-labeled food, while those who
received only negative information discounted the
“GM”-labeled food by 35 percent (oil and chips) and
38 percent (potatoes). Those who received both posi-
tive and negative information put slightly more weight
on the negative information, discounting the “GM”-
labeled foods by 16-29 percent, depending on the
product. In their experiments, Fox, Hayes, and
Shogren (2002) found that negative information domi-
nated positive information. They argued that one rea-
son could be due to a “status quo bias” (or endowment
effect). They argued that losses associated with switch-
ing to an alternative are given greater weight than cor-
responding gains; that is, there is a bias in favor of sta-
tus quo. In their experiment, participants were origi-
nally endowed with a regular pork sandwich (the prod-
uct under investigation) and could bid to upgrade to an
irradiated pork sandwich, where irradiation reduces the
risk of parasitic illness. Our auction had participants
bid on items in separate rounds (trials), thereby elimi-
nating the possibility of a “status quo bias.”
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Figure 8
Chips:  Mean bids for GM-labeled and  
standard-labeled foods
Dollars
Note: A = only positive information; B = only negative information;  
C = both positive and negative information; D = both positive  
and third-party information; E = both negative and third-party  
information; and F = positive, negative, and third-party information.     
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Figure 9
Potatoes:  Mean bids for GM-labeled and  
standard-labeled foods
Dollars
Note: A = only positive information; B = only negative information;  
C = both positive and negative information; D = both positive  
and third-party information; E = both negative and third-party  
information; and F = positive, negative, and third-party information.     
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Regression analysis provides the statistical framework
for examining consumer behavior and answering the
questions raised earlier in the bulletin. The dependent
variable in all of the regressions is the difference in bid
prices for a plain-labeled and “GM”-labeled product
for each participant. Thus, consumers’ tastes are held
constant for each of the three products. We can express
bid difference as the difference between inverse
demand functions for the two products. Let the inverse
demand equation for the “GM”-labeled food (called
labeled), and the plain or standard-labeled food (called
non-labeled) be:
(1) Pjnon-labeled=β1non-labeled+β2non-labeledXj2+µjnon-labeled
and 
(2) Pjlabeled=β1labeled+β2labeledXj2+µjlabeled
where Pj represents the price bid for a good by partici-
pant j; β1 is an intercept term; Xj2 is a vector of exoge-
nous variables and β2 is the associated vector of coeffi-
cients. µj is the random error term for participant j. 
Subtracting equation (2) from equation (1), we obtain
an equation where the dependent variable is the differ-
ence in bid prices for the two trials, as shown in equa-
tion (3):
The coefficients and error terms can be condensed and
rewritten as shown in equation (3a):
The difference in bid prices is explained by an inter-
cept term , a slope     term that is multiplied by a
vector of exogenous characteristics Xj2, and a random
error term    . Equation (3a) can now be estimated.
Equation (3a), however, is likely to be censored since
consumers were restricted to a minimum bid of zero
for a product. The censored bid prices are the zero
bids for the “GM”-labeled and/or the plain-labeled
product. This censored regression model has four
cases. In case (1), consumer j bids a positive amount
for both the “GM”-labeled and the plain-labeled prod-
uct. The measured difference in bid prices is just the
difference between the two bid prices. Case (2) occurs
when consumer j bids zero for the “GM”-labeled prod-
uct and a positive amount for the plain-labeled prod-
uct. The true difference in bid prices with the censored
regression will be greater than the difference between
the two observed bid prices. This arises from the fact
that the bids on the “GM”-labeled product were cen-
sored at zero. Case (3) occurs when consumer j bids a
positive amount for the “GM”-labeled product and
zero for the plain-labeled product. Like case (2), the
true difference in bid prices for the censored regres-
sion is (absolutely) larger than the measured difference
between the two bid prices, because the participant’s
bid for the plain-labeled product is censored. Case (4)
occurs when consumer j bids zero for both products.
This does not give any information about their true
demand for biotech products. A summary of the four
cases is given in figure 10. 
By using the censored regression model, the zero bid
prices are correctly accounted for, and effects of bias
from the zero bids are minimized. Hence, we expect
the coefficient estimates for this regression method to
have better statistical properties than if we had ignored
the censoring. Statistical tests are conducted using the
likelihood ratio test statistic (Greene, 2000).12 The
large sample distribution of – 2 1n λ is chi-squared,
with degrees of freedom equal to the number of
restrictions imposed.
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Econometric Model
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12 The likelihood ratio takes the maximum of the likelihood func-
tion of a regression that only has an intercept term (the restricted
equation) divided by the maximum of the likelihood function of
the regression that includes some explanatory variables (the unre-
stricted equation). This is shown in the following equation:
In this equation, represents the maximum of the likelihood func-
tion for the regression with only the intercept term, and      repre-
sents the maximum of the likelihood function for the unrestricted
equation.
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Regression Results
The censored regression results are presented in tables
3-5.13 For all three goods, models were fitted using
five dummy variables to test for impacts of different
information types. Dummy variables are defined for
negative information; negative and positive informa-
tion; positive and third-party information; negative and
third-party information; and positive, negative, and
third-party information. Positive information is the
omitted information type. Other regressors include
gender (dummy variable taking a value of 1 if a person
is female), income, “labels Round 1” (a dummy vari-
able taking a value of 1 if a participant bid on foods
with “GM” labels in round 1 and plain labels in round
2), and “informed” (a dummy variable taking a value
of 1 if the participant perceived himself (herself) to be
well informed about biotech foods).14
Regression (1) in tables 3-5 reports on the test of the
difference in bid prices due to “GM” labels. The inter-
cept term in regression (1) of tables 3-5 is positive and
statistically significant, implying that, on average, par-
ticipants were willing to pay 19 cents less for a 32-
ounce bottle of vegetable oil labeled as “GM,” 21
cents less for a 1-pound bag of tortilla chips labeled as
“GM,” and 17 cents less for a 5-pound bag of Russet
potatoes labeled “GM.” Hence, “GM” labels have a
statistically significant effect on consumers’ willing-
ness to pay for each food item. 
Regression (2) is used for testing the effect of informa-
tion types on the willingness to pay for “GM”-labeled
and plain-labeled food products. The coefficients for
“Anti,” a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if a partic-
ipant received only negative information, are large, posi-
tive, and statistically significant in all cases. The coeffi-
cients for “Pro and Anti,” a dummy variable taking a
value of 1 if an individual received positive and negative
information, are positive, and these coefficients are sta-
tistically significant for some of the products. These
results show that individuals who received only negative
or both positive and negative information behaved dif-
ferently than individuals who received only positive
information when making purchasing decisions. The
coefficients for “Pro- and Third-party,” a dummy vari-
able taking a value of 1 if an individual received posi-
tive and third-party information, are small, positive, and
not statistically significant. Hence, third-party informa-
tion does not have a large impact on the difference in
bids between the plain-labeled and “GM” labeled foods
for participants who received only positive information.
The coefficients for “Anti- and Third-party,” a dummy
variable indicating that a participant received negative
and third-party information, are generally statistically
significant. The coefficients for “All information,” a
dummy variable indicating that a participant received all
three types of information, are not statistically different
from zero for any of the food products. Hence, the
impact is similar to the outcome when consumers
received only positive information. The coefficient for
the dummy variable “labels Round 1” is negative in all
cases, indicating that participants who bid on the “GM”-
labeled food in the first round paid a smaller premium
for plain-labeled food than the other participants.
However, the coefficient is statistically significant for
only one of the food items (potatoes). 
In regression (3), the difference in bid prices is regressed
on an intercept term, information types, and the variable
“labels round 1.” The coefficient of this dummy variable
is negative for all three products, indicating that partici-
pants who bid first on the “GM”-labeled food in the first
round discounted the “GM”-labeled food less than the
other participants. However, the coefficient of the “labels
round 1” was not statistically significant. 
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Figure 10
The four cases of the censored regression
Case Plain-labeled bid "GM"-labeled bid Censored regression difference
1. P non-labeled P labeled P non-labeled_ P labeled
2. P non-labeled 0 > P non-labeled1
3. 0 P labeled <−P labeled or >− P labeled
4. 0 0 •
Note: "• " represents a missing value, due to the zero bid.
13 Ordinary least square regressions were also fitted to 172 obser-
vations, and to the observations remaining after “double-zero” bids
were excluded. The results for these regressions are similar and
may be requested from the authors.
14 Several other models were fitted which included (as regressors)
the participant’s age, marital status, religious upbringing, and edu-
cational attainment. None of these variables, however, impacted
the difference in bid prices in a statistically significant way (at the
10-percent level).
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Table 3—Censored regression estimates explaining difference in bid prices between “GM”-labeled 
and plain-labeled tortilla chips
Dependent variable: Bid price non-labeled food–bid price GM-labeled food
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Intercept 0.209** 0.060 0.093 0.106 0.008 0.039 -0.034
(.046) (0.099) (0.110) (0.119) (0.137) (0.119) (0.151)
Anti - 0.481 ** 0.473 ** 0.474 ** 0.481 ** 0.489 ** 0.494 **
(0.145) (0.145) (0.145) (0.144) (0.145) (0.144)
Pro and Anti - 0.132 0.124 0.128 0.138 0.136 0.147
(0.152) (0.153) (0.153) (0.152) (0.152) (0.153)
Pro and - 0.035 0.031 0.035 0.003 0.023 0.001
Third-party (0.147) (0.147) (0.147) (0.148) (0.146) (0.148)
Anti and - 0.245 * 0.241 0.246 ** 0.244 * 0.241 0.256 *
Third-party (0.148) (0.148) (0.149) (0.147) (0.147) (0.148)
All information - -0.027 -0.023 -0.019 0.003 -0.028 -0.009
(0.151) (0.151) (0.151) (0.151) (0.151) (0.151)
Labels-Round 1 - - -0.063  -0.063 -0.064 -0.045 -0.050
(0.089) (0.089) (0.089) (0.090) (0.090)
Gender - - - -0.025 - - -0.011
(0.091) (0.091)
Income - - - - 0.0017 - 0.0015
(0.0014) (0.0014)
Informed - - - - - 0.104 0.087
(0.092) (0.093)
Likelihood ratio - 15.92 ** 16.28 ** 16.49 ** 17.93 ** 17.70 ** 18.83 **
** indicates that a variable is significant at 5 percent.
*  indicates that a variable is significant at 10 percent.
(n=172, standard errors are in parentheses).
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Table 4—Censored regression estimates explaining difference in bid prices between “GM”-labeled 
and plain-labeled vegetable oil
Dependent variable: Bid price non-labeled food–bid price GM-labeled food
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Intercept .193** -0.032 0.053 0.117 -0.128 -0.015 -0.104
(.056) (0.126) (0.142) (0.150) (0.169) (0.152) (0.180)
Anti - 0.530 ** 0.496 ** 0.504 ** 0.505 ** 0.516 ** 0.529 **
(0.180) (0.181) (0.180) (0.179) (0.181) (0.178)
Pro and Anti - 0.259 0.231 0.262 0.255 0.250 0.295
(0.183) (0.183) (0.183) (0.181) (0.182) (0.181)
Pro and - 0.061 0.046 0.079 -0.012 0.032 0.014
Third-Party (0.179) (0.178) (0.179) (0.178) (0.177) (0.179)
Anti and - 0.335 * 0.301 0.338 * 0.288 0.312 * 0.333 *
Third-Party (0.190) (0.191) (0.192) (0.188) (0.190) (0.189)
All information - 0.186 0.181 0.204 0.208 0.170 0.218
(0.185) (0.184) (0.184) (0.182) (0.184) (0.182)
Labels-Round 1 - - -0.139 -0.136 -0.149 -0.115 -0.127
(0.109) (0.108) (0.107) (0.110) (0.108)
Gender - -  - -0.140 - - -0.131
(0.111) (0.109)
Income - - - - 0.0032 * - 0.0029 *
(0.0017) 0.0017)
Informed - - - - - 0.142 0.112
(0.113) (0.112)
Likelihood ratio - 10.90 * 12.52 * 14.11 ** 16.21 ** 14.09 ** 18.63 **
** indicates that a variable is significant at 5 percent
*  indicates that a variable is significant at 10 percent.
(n=172, standard errors are in parentheses).
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Table 5—Censored regression estimates explaining difference in bid prices between “GM”-labeled 
and plain-labeled potatoes
Dependent variable: Bid price non-labeled food–bid price GM-labeled food
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Intercept 0.175** -0.039 0.064 0.076 -0.019 -0.029 -0.069
(.039 (0.088) (0.096) (0.103) (0.117) (0.101) (0.124)
Anti - 0.504 ** 0.470 ** 0.472 ** 0.478 ** 0.501 ** 0.507 **
(0.125) (0.122) (0.122) (0.122) (0.120) (0.120)
Pro and Anti - 0.262 ** 0.233 * 0.239 * 0.248 ** 0.258 ** 0.271 **
(0.126) (0.124) (0.125) (0.124) (0.122 (0.123)
Pro and - 0.057 0.041 0.046 0.018 0.026 0.015
Third-Party (0.125) (0.123) (0.123) (0.124) (0.120) (0.122)
Anti and - 0.339 ** 0.323 ** 0.329 ** 0.322 ** 0.332 ** 0.337 **
Third-Party (0.125) (0.123) (0.124) (0.122) (0.120) (0.122)
All information - 0.088 0.095 0.099 0.110 0.078 0.092
(0.128) (0.126) (0.126) (0.126) (0.124) (0.124)
Labels-Round 1 - - -0.174 ** -0.174 ** -0.177 ** -0.146 ** -0.150 **
(0.073) (0.073) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072)
Gender - - - -0.026 - - -0.022
(0.075) (0.074)
Income - - - - 0.0014 - 0.0009 
(0.0014) (0.0011)
Informed - - - - - 0.190 ** 0.179 **
(0.074) (0.075)
Likelihood ratio - 22.54 ** 28.17 ** 28.29 ** 29.69 ** 34.56 ** 35.36 **
** indicates that a variable is significant at 5 percent.
*  indicates that a variable is significant at 10 percent.
(n=172, standard errors are in parentheses).
Regressions (4)-(6) are used to test the effect of gender,
income, and being “well informed about ‘GM’ foods”
on the willingness to pay. Few demographic variables
had an impact on the difference in bid prices. Women
discounted “GM”-labeled foods less than men for all
three products in the auctions. However, none of the
coefficients was statistically significant from zero.
Those consumers who had higher incomes discounted
all three “GM”-labeled food products more than those
who had lower incomes. The coefficient is statistically
significant for one of the three products—vegetable oil.
It is not surprising that higher income consumers dis-
counted “GM”-labeled foods more heavily. This is con-
sistent with “food quality” being a luxury good.
Consumers who considered themselves “well
informed about ‘GM’ foods” (as recorded in the pre-
auction survey) discounted “GM”-labeled foods more
than other participants. This coefficient is statistically
significant (10-percent level) for one of the three
food products–Russet potatoes. Those who perceived
themselves to be informed bid far less for the “GM”-
labeled foods than other bidders. This result suggests
they had heard negative information on “GM” foods.
This result contrasts with the survey results obtained
by Boccaleti and Moro (2000) which indicates,
among people who rated their degree of awareness
about “GM” as good, over 60 percent were positive
toward “GM” foods. Regression (7) includes all the
variables in regressions (1)-(6). The results are simi-
lar to the regressions (1)-(6). In all of the censored
regression equations, we rejected the null hypothesis
that the explanatory variables included in the regres-
sion had no explanatory power (or all non-intercept
coefficients were jointly zero).
The results from our experiments are noteworthy.
Consumers discounted food products labeled “GM” by
14 percent, based on information they received. In
comparing “GM”-labeled with standard- or plain-
labeled products, consumers might have perceived the
plain-labeled products as non-“GM.” The discounting
was similar across the three products, suggesting that
most consumers perceive net biotech effects similarly
for the three goods. If the term “GM” “taps anxieties
that precondition consumers to be wary of biotechnol-
ogy” (Schmidt, 2002), then the 14-percent discount for
biotech foods could be considered as an upper bound.
The result that consumers discount “GM”-labeled
foods has notable implications given the ongoing glob-
al controversy over the issue of labels on biotech
foods. This debate has forced many countries around
the world to consider or to implement new food label-
ing policies. This trend has strong implications for
grain handlers, food manufacturers, and others in the
supply chain. For example, in January 2000, Best
Foods Inc. decided to end its use of biotech ingredi-
ents in manufactured foods destined for the EU, in
order to avoid the biotech labeling requirements; and
Frito-Lay Inc. announced that it would cease using
biotech corn in its snack foods manufacturing (Lin,
Chambers, and Harwood, 2000). 
Given that the participants in the study did reveal a
significant discount for foods labeled “GM,” a manda-
tory biotech labeling policy seems likely to reduce
demand for biotech products. Assuming that the partic-
ipants in the experiment are representative of the U.S.
population, there appears to be a strong preference for
non-biotech. However, the demand for these non-
biotech (and biotech) products is influenced by the
type of information about biotechnology that con-
sumers receive. FDA focus groups and IFIC studies
also indicate that consumers may react differently to
terms such as “GM,” “biotech,” “genetically engi-
neered,” “bioengineered,” etc. According to IFIC, if
the benefits of biotechnology are effectively communi-
cated, U.S. consumers will accept biotech foods
(Schmidt, 2002). 
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This study has shown that consumers’ willingness to
pay for food products decreases when the food label
indicates that a food product is produced using
biotechnology. Consumers discounted food items
labeled “GM” by 14 percent. In addition, gender,
income, and other demographic characteristics appear
to have only a slight impact on consumers’ willingness
to pay for biotech foods. However, information from
interested parties and third-party information do influ-
ence consumers’ willingness to pay for biotech and
(perceived) non-biotech foods. The use of “GM” rather
than “biotech” or “bioengineered” on the labels could
also have influenced the results. 
The data presented in table 2 show that consumers
who received only negative information about biotech-
nology paid 35-38 percent less for food products
labeled “GM,” depending on the product. When the
negative information is coupled with independent
third-party information, they were willing to pay only
17-22 percent less for “GM”-labeled food. Likewise,
when consumers were given only positive information
about biotechnology, consumers bid higher for “GM”-
labeled than plain-labeled food for two of the three
food items. However, when consumers were provided
with positive information from the industry perspective
and the independent third-party perspective, they bid
higher for plain-labeled food in all three cases.
The econometric results presented in tables 3-5 also
showed that consumers who received only positive
information behaved differently from those who
received only negative information and both negative
and third-party information. The third-party informa-
tion does not appear to change the behavior of those
who receive positive information. Demographic vari-
ables such as gender and income have little impact on
the willingness to pay for “GM”-labeled and plain-
labeled food products.
With bioengineering remaining controversial, informa-
tion on biotech foods will have a major impact on con-
sumer acceptance of foods with biotech labels. This
experimental auction has produced the following
results. First, people, on average, were willing to pay
17-21 cents per unit more to purchase plain-labeled
food than “GM”-labeled food. Consumers might have
perceived the plain-labeled products as non-biotech.
Nonetheless, the observation that such a large “premi-
um” exists for food items that are perceived to be non-
biotech has strong implications for grain handlers,
food manufacturers, and others in the marketing sys-
tem. Second, information about biotechnology from
interested parties has an impact on consumer demand.
This helps explain why groups such as Greenpeace
and Friends of the Earth have been disseminating mas-
sive amounts of negative information on biotech foods.
Likewise, it explains why biotechnology companies
have invested heavily to advertise the positive aspects
of biotechnology (Thrane, 2001).
Third, an independent, third-party source that provides
verifiable information about biotechnology has a sig-
nificant impact on consumers’ demand for biotech
foods. Third-party information had its greatest impact
on consumers who received negative information,
prompting them to view biotech foods more favorably. 
Much future research on this topic remains. New
research is currently testing the impact of information
on the willingness to pay for foods with negative
biotech labels, that is, labels that say, “This product is
not made using biotechnology.” The food products in
these auctions were bioengineered and deemed sub-
stantially equivalent to the conventional commodity.
However, there are biotech foods being developed to
enhance the quality (e.g., protein, fat, sugar content,
and shelf life) of the product. None of these products
are currently on the market. Future research could
examine how consumers react to biotech foods that
have specific benefits. Finally, future research could
also examine if language on the label (e.g., “GM,”
biotech, bioengineered, genetically engineered, etc.)
would have an impact on consumers’ willingness to
pay for these biotech foods.
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